Long-term incentive programmes
Alligo’s long‑term incentive programmes are designed to strengthen the ownership perspective and reward performance linked to the company’s profitability, sustainability targets and long‑term value creation. Alligo has a clear strategy to achieve profitable growth and create shareholder value.
Principles for incentive programmes
Alligo uses sharebased incentive programmes to align senior executives’ remuneration with the Group’s longterm development. These programmes are approved by the AGM and aim to support sustainable performance, strengthen competitiveness and contribute to increased shareholder value. The Board evaluates the need for new programmes each year and may propose adjustments for future general meetings.
The Board of Directors believes that a performance-based incentive programme, with personal investment and a clear link to performance and sustainability, supports engagement in Alligo’s long-term success. The programme is also expected to support recruitment and help retain key personnel, including participants outside Sweden.
If a sharebased programme cannot be applied for a participant, for example due to tax or administrative constraints, an equivalent incentive may be offered to ensure a consistent structure.
Alligo has two outstanding incentive programmes directed to the Group management and other senior executives, PSP 2025 and PSP 2024.
PSP 2025/2028
PSP 2025 is aimed at Group Management and other senior executives. The programme is designed to encourage a longterm ownership perspective and ensure that key individuals have strong incentives to contribute to Alligo’s financial and sustainabilityrelated targets.
During the investment period from 2 to 4 June 2025, participants were offered the opportunity to acquire Bshares as investment shares at a price corresponding to the volumeweighted average share price on Nasdaq Stockholm during 22–28 May 2025. A total of 20,250 investment shares were acquired, of which 6,450 were purchased by the Group’s CEO and CFO and 13,800 by other key individuals, at an average price of SEK 110.65 per share.
Each investment share provides five performance share rights, which may entitle the participant to receive up to one Bshare free of charge, depending on performance in two areas: development in adjusted EBITA and fulfilment of defined sustainability targets during a vesting period of approximately three years. Allocation also requires that the participant remains employed and retains all acquired investment shares throughout the entire vesting period.
Under PSP 2025, a maximum of 101,250 performance shares may be allocated based on the number of investment shares acquired.
PSP 2024/2027
PSP 2024 covers Group Management and other senior executives and is designed to align their remuneration with Alligo’s long‑term profitability and sustainability targets. During the investment period from 31 May to 4 June 2024, participants were able to acquire B‑shares in Alligo as investment shares at a price corresponding to the volume‑weighted average share price on Nasdaq Stockholm during 24–30 May 2024. A maximum of 20,475 Class B shares could be transferred.
A total of 16,749 investment shares were acquired under the programme, of which 5,725 by the Group’s CEO and CFO and 11,024 by other key individuals, at an average price of SEK 143.00 per share.
For each investment share, participants receive five performance share rights. These may result in the allocation of up to one B‑share free of charge, provided that two overarching targets are met: growth in adjusted EBITA and fulfilment of defined sustainability targets during a vesting period of approximately three years. Allocation also requires continued employment and that the participant retains all investment shares throughout the vesting period.
A maximum of 83,745 performance shares may be allocated under PSP 2024.
2022/2025 Call Option Programme
The call option programme 2022/2025 was designed to create a long‑term incentive linked to Alligo’s share price performance. Participants could exercise their options only if the share price exceeded the strike price at the end of the programme.
The programme comprised 185,000 options, of which 80,000 were acquired by the CEO and CFO and 105,000 by other key individuals. When the programme expired in 2025, the share price targets had not been met and no options were exercised. The programme therefore concluded without any cost to Alligo.